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Introduction
An early experiment with an exchange-rate band was implemented in Austria-Hungary between 1896 and World War I. This experience is relevant for our understanding of the impact of exchangerate arrangements on monetary policy insofar as this it was explicitly designed as an early version of what has become known after Krugman's seminal paper (Krugman [1991] ) as a "target zone".
Economic concepts are supposedly like modern Athenas: we think of them as being born fully mature and armed. While economists generally pay insufficient attention to the archaeology of ideas, these are nonetheless significant not only in and for themselves, but because they improve our understanding of economic concepts (Blaug [2001] ). Historical experience also provide rare instances for testing econimc theories, in a discipline which is at pains to generate "controlled experiments".
The Austro-Hungarian experience commands our interest, because unlike so many recent attempts with exchange rate bands, which have been almost immediately put under strain before they collapsed in infamous speculative attacks, the Austro-Hungarian experiment was operating rather smoothly for almost two decades, between 1896 and 1914. Policy makers were never short of words to praise it: for instance, the Governor of the Austro-Hungarian Bank, Leon Bilinski, found this policy "original", "excellent", -indeed an "innovation" that had enhanced the bank's reputation greatly, both in the financial markets and in academia (Federn, 1911 (Federn, , 1388 . Moreover, contemporary observers rationalized this system in strikingly modern terms: the (invisible ) band provided means for the exchange rate to act as a substitute to raising the interest rate (Federn, 1910b, 662; Federn, 1911 Federn, , 1391 Federn, 1912) . This is surprisingly reminiscent of Svensson [1992, 1994] who emphasized that Krugman-type currency bands work by providing monetary authorities tools for maintaining stability with a measure of flexibility.
Thus, an empirical exploration of the Habsburg experience should provide us with some useful theoretical insights. Working with an entirely new data set assembled from archival sources, we first show that the creation of a credible target zone changed the very quality of expectations. It improved market performance in predicting future exchange rate changes. This intriguing "microeconomic channel" has been all but neglected in the modern literature, and yet it might be a decisive one. We also suggest that the existence of transaction costs should lead us to revise our conventional strategies for analyzing actual currency bands. The scope for a stability-autonomy trade off is better gauged by looking at the 2 relation between the forward premium and the exchange rate, rather than at the relation between interest differentials and exchange rates. As for testing whether a given target zone experiment is successful or not, we show that this matter requires looking at a dynamic framework.
The remainder of the paper works as follows. Section I surveys the record of the Austro-Hungarian experiment. Section II reviews a number of theoretical questions: we argue that the target zone model relies on a set of joint hypotheses, which should be gauged one at a time. Covered and uncovered interest parity (two key assumptions of modern target zone models) are thus dealt with in section III and IV. Section V provides a new test of target zones, emphasizing that the classic relation between interest rates and exchange rates should be understood as being fundamentally dynamic. We end with conclusions and policy implications.
Section I. Victims of dead policy makers?
As is well known, fin-de-siècle Vienna was a hotbed of creativity in areas ranging from psychoanalysis (Freud) to philosophy (Wittgenstein) to Art Nouveau (Klimt) and of course to economics (Menger, Böhm-Bawerk) . Much less well known, or perhaps even long forgotten, is the fact that creative genius was also at work in inventing and practicing the modern target zone theory, so that it became the backbone of the actual monetary management practices of the Austro-Hungarian bank before 1914. Svensson credits Keynes Treatise on money (Keynes [1931] ) with this insight. It is true that Keynes had argued that there was a correspondence between the distance within the «gold points» (as exchange rate bands were known for countries adhering to gold convertibility) and the degree of short-term policy autonomy. 1 Wider bands, he argued, would provide more leeway for monetary policy. But he did not explain how, beyond the general notion that, within a band, exchange rates get some flexibility. As recognized in a book that was perhaps not incidentally dedicated to the famous British economist ), Keynes' insight had its roots in the pre-war policies of the central bank of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. Einzig suggested explicitly that there was a link between Austro-Hungarian policies and Keynes' intuitions. The Austro-Hungarian policy, Einzig argued, "closely resembles Mr. Keynes's proposal for the widening of the margin between gold points" (Einzig 1937, 332-3) . 2 Better still, as we shall proceed to show, the Austro-Hungarian target zone policy was motivated in a strikingly modern fashion that we do not find in Keynes.
Historically, these policies emerged in 1896 as a way to reconcile two conflicting goals. On the one hand, monetary authorities had been instructed to achieve, through the monetary laws of 1892 and 3 1893, exchange stabilization. These laws had set a fixed exchange rate target, assigning a gold equivalent to the Austro-Hungarian florin. On the other hand, authorities were concerned with retaining at least part of the protection from foreign exchange -rate shocks that was thought to have existed in the past behind the "Chinese wall" of the former system of flexible exchange rates (Lotz [1889] ). In particular, Austro-Hungarian authorities wanted to avoid excessive increases in the discount rate, which would have obtained perforce, it was thought, under a fully fixed exchange rate, with adverse impact on the real side of the domestic economy (Knapp, 1909, 250; Mises 1909b) . Moreover, discount rate changes were a potential source of conflict between the Austrian and the Hungarian parts of the Monarchy and their occurrence was to be minimized. 3 The practical solution found to this problem was to stabilize the currency against the mark within an informal band. This policy was implemented progressively in the course of 1896 and maintained until 1914 ( Figure 1 ). The size of the band was understood by market participants to be of about [ ? 0.4%] around parity. 4 From the writings of contemporary authors such as Federn [1909] one gets the sense that policy makers of the time had an intuitive understanding of the dangers of one sided bets: formal bands would have committed authorities to throw their entire reserves in an exchange rate battle at the gold point, should a confidence crises arise, so precise bounds were avoided. 5 The band was thus defended through discretionary foreign exchange intervention that occurred when the exchange rate approached its informal upper or lower limit, and occasional departures from the informal band could be tolerated, provided they would be short lived. Figure 2 illustrates the credibility record of the Habsburg experiment by plotting a measure of the expected exchange rate (specifically, we use the one month ahead forward rate) against the informal band on the florin. This is known as Svensson's 100% credibility test. It rests on investigating whether expected rate lies within the band (credibility holds) or whether the band is systematically viol ated (credibility does not hold). The series for the forward rate was collected from contemporary sources (see appendix). We use the [ ? 0.4%] informal interval as fluctuation band, keeping in mind that it was understood that authorities could in some cases let the exchange rate depreciate beyond these informal points without this being a signal that the band was jeopardized. As can be seen "violations" were rare, especially after 1901, which is conventionally portrayed as the period when the stabilization of the florin was completed. In other words, future trades factored in the fact that monetary authorities would take 4 action to prevent continued departure from the notional currency band that was understood to operate: all in al l, the florin currency band was credible. 7 Figure 2
According to contemporary observers, credibility in turn was the lever through which monetary Suppose now that a given country adopts a policy of preventing the exchange rate from departing from some interval centered on a given parity against another currency. If this policy is credible, then interest rate differentials between the two countries should be inversely related to the location of the exchange rate within the band. This is because since the exchange rate is bounded above and below (because of interventions), the likelihood of continued exchange rate appreciation, when the currency is strong, is low, and so is the likelihood of continued exchange rate depreciation when the exchange rate is weak. A measure of mean reversion is thus built into such a bounded process and rationa l agents realize it: they accept a lower interest rate for a currency that is momentarily weaker, because of expected capital gains on its future appreciation, and require a higher interest rate from a currency that is momentarily stronger, because of expected capital losses. Figure 3 illustrates this basic principle, by
showing the predicted relation between exchange rates and interest rate differentials as they can be explicitly obtained in Krugman's model. While certainly only one among a variety of testable predictions of the model, Figure 3 has attracted much attention, and with good reasons. On top of being easily testable, it nicely captures the essence of the much vaunted exchange rate stability vs monetary policy autonomy trade off which is said to be the key advantage of an exchange rate target zone. And given that, as we found, Habsburg policy makers thought of this issue in precisely this way, uncovering the pattern exhibited in Figure 3 should guide our investigation. By many aspects, our paper should be understood as a reflection on this central theme. Early research on contemporary experiences has basically rejected this prediction of the model thus casting doubt on the possibility of a stability-autonomy trade-off (see Svensson [1992] for an early survey). Focusing on the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (1979 Mechanism ( -1998 researchers found that whenever the exchange rate depreciated towards the edge of the band, the interest rate of the weaker currency rose above that of the stronger one. Thus, exchange rate depreciation was associated with higher, not lower, domestic interest rates, in sharp contrast to the pattern predicted in Figure 3 .
Therefore, a consensus emerged that the ERM must have lacked credibility. This meant that depreciation towards the edge of the band was interpreted as a signal that a change in parity was imminent. To account for that, the Krugman model was extended to include the possibility of a devaluation in the central parity (see Bertola and Svensson [1993] ). Some authors used this addition to gauge the credibility of various pegged exchange rate arrangements (Hallwood, MacDonald, and Marsch [1998] ). However, since in real world situations, the likelihood of a devaluation should be correlated with the position of the exchange rate within the band, it is not clear what happens to the stability-autonomy trade off when credibility is lacking. 11 Clearly, without credibility, the key policy advantage of the target zone system has been lo st en route.
But what about credible experiments, such as the one discussed in this paper? Controlling for credibility, one should be able to get a picture that is much closer to the one predicted in Figure 3 .
Consistently, Figure 4 .a plots the relation between exchange rates and interest rate differentials for our Austro-Hungarian experiment. The result is far from satisfying: one gets a vaguely downward sloping cloud. In effect, this result is quite typical of studies focusing on exchange bands with strong credibility, such as those of the late 19 th century: while earlier research has sometimes reported a negative estimated relation between interest differentials and exchange rates deviations from parity (Flood, Rose and Mathieson [1991] , Bordo and MacDonald [1997] , Bordo and MacDonald [1999] ), providing some support to the existence of a trade-off, the eyeball impression on gets when the underlying data is shown is always frustrating. This is illustrated in Figure 4 .b which depicts the exchange rates and interest differentials for UK vs France, 1880-1914. Again, the cloudy feeling prevails.
Figures 4.a and b
From these exercises, it is hard to conclude without doubts that earlier bands provided enough of the much desired policy autonomy, despite all the efforts that contemporaries made to secure credibility.
Could the lesson be that even in the best-case scenario, the trade-off remains modest? In a sense, the 7 more 'favorable' results one obtains with credible experiences could be interpreted as devastating evidence against the existence of a stability-autonomy trade-off. Why, then, were contemporaries so impressed with the operation of the Habsburg target zone? Or is it, as we shall argue in this paper, that the story is just more subtle than has been acknowledged so far, that the standard way the basic model has been tested is flawed, and that a more careful discussion of the empirics of target zones is in order?
Section III Foreign exchange market efficiency
As argued earlier, the existence of a stability-autonomy trade-off rests on a set of joint hypotheses.
Even if credibility is sustained, strong form efficiency and covered interest parities need to hold. It is thus tremendously important to determine whether or not these assumptions are warranted. Here again, the Habsburg experience should prove very useful because unlike for all other pre-1914 exchange rate regimes studied recently, Austria -Hungary had a well-developed markets for forward exchange. The data required to test both hypotheses are, thus, available.
Let's begin with efficiency. The efficiency of 19 th -century forward markets has remained virtually unexplored -perhaps because they were so few in number and the pertinent data are not readily available. 12 We proceed to test the efficiency of the florin/mark market before and after the stabilization of the florin. The approach we adopt follows a well established tradition (Fama [1984] 
where ? t is a random shock, s t is the log spot rate at month t and f t the log forward rate quoted at month t for delivery at t+1. 13 The results point to a sharp contrast in the performance of the markets during the period of the float and the period of target zone, especially after 1901 (Table 2) . Strictly speaking, market efficiency is not inconsistent with the data for the period before 1901 but this comes from the low explanatory power of the equation under scrutiny: low t-statistics, occasionally negative estimated ?s, negligible adjusted R 2 , and F tests generally point towards low market efficiency or outright inefficiency before the currency was stabilized. 18 After the interregnum of 1896-1901, however, the golden age of the florin target zone provides support to the strongest form of the efficient market hypothesis ( Finally, the F-test leads us to accept unambiguously the null of market efficiency. 20 The conclusion is that the stabilization of the florin after the turn of the century produced a considerable improvement in the efficiency of the foreign exchange market. Variations of the forward rate became easier to predict.
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The previous conclusion has far-reaching consequences for the relation between spot rates and the implicit rate of expected exchange rate changes one can derive from the forward premium: efficiency in a forward market when the underlying exchange rate is kept in a band (and thus mean reverting) should translate into a negative relationship between the location of the exchange rate and the expected rate of depreciation. way that the market expected a future appreciation when the currency was weak and a future depreciation when the currency was strong. This undoubtedly created a favorable environment for policy makers, who should have been able, as a result, to rely in market expectations as a stabilizing
device. Specifically, they should not have felt any pressure for raising their base rate when the currency 10 was weak, since market participants expected eventual capital gains. Why, then, is it that we find the pattern in Figure 4 .a, whereby the apparent trade-off is far from obvious? Answering that question requires carefully documenting covered interest parity.
a) Covered interest parity, a cursory look
Formally the condition that needs to be tested (recalling that interest rates are given as percentage per annum while forward rates are one month ahead contracts) reads (both f and s are in logs. We multiply by 12 to obtain annualized rates, since the forward rate is for the next month, and by 100 to obtain percentage ):
? ? The open market should be preferred because it is the relevant rate for covered interest parity arbitrage.
On the other hand, the official rate is the one that was of concern to policy makers. This is why we use both. The charts suggest that it was only after 1895 that the resemblance between expected depreciation and interest differentials improved. But even then the similarity was not perfect. Covered interest parity cannot be taken for granted, which may explain why the link between exchange rates and interest rate differentials is lose.
Figures 6.a and b b) Covered interest parity, 2: a naïve test
To go beyond the previous exercise, a popular test of CIP (MacDonald [1988] 
where the null that (2) is true is accepted if one cannot reject ? =0 and ? =1. Table 3 .a reports straight OLS output. Table 3 .b controls for the auto-correlation of residuals. Once again the results indicate that a transformation occurred around 1896. At the same time, these tests lead to reject covered interest parity for all periods. The integration of money and foreign exchange markets was not perfect. 
c) Covered interest parity: within the neutral band
This last conclusion however, should be qualified. The rationale for equation (2) rests on an arbitrage relation. But arbitrage entails costs. This motivates an al ternative strategy that compares actual deviations from interest parity to arbitrage costs. Estimating arbitrage costs is difficult. It requires a knowledge of the operation of foreign exchange and money markets. This has often led modern researchers to use indirect routes (Frenkel and Levich [1975] , MacDonald [1988] ).
In our case, however, a direct measure can be obtained. Consider a banker who performs CIP arbitrage between Berlin and Vienna. We know from , p. 332), that this practice was "highly developed in Vienna for decades before the war". Our banker has access to both money markets where he can lend or borrow at the prevailing open market rate. If (2) does not hold, for 12 instance, when the Berlin rate is too high, arbitrage is feasible. This involves borrowing florins for one month in Vienna, selling the proceeds spot, then lending in Berlin for one month while covering the operation through a forward contract.
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The expenses involved in the arbitrage are straightforward: the operation implies one spot purchase and one forward sale. Thus, the banker ends up paying the bid-ask spread once (he is a seller in one transaction and a purchaser in the other one). This amounted, to a 0.1 florin charge when the exchange rate fluctuated around fl. 60 or about 0.166% of the transaction, a number which as a matter of fact is quite in line with modern spreads. This translates into an interest loss of about 2% per annum (0.166% times 12 months 
The simple test is the following: we accept the null that CIP holds if (4) holds. Figure 7 does just this comparing the "spread" between interest differentials and expected rate of exchange rate change to the "neutral band". As seen, some violations occurred before 1896, but they virtually disappeared thereafter. Moreover, the deviations were found after that date in a much narrower range than the neutral band. From this respect, integration of the money and foreign exchange markets prevailed by and large throughout the entire period under study and probably improved after 1896. But the important conclusion here is that the apparently weak relationship in Figure 4 .a can be understood as the natural consequence of arbitrage costs. The intuition is nothing else than the familiar principle of Tobin taxes:
transaction costs on interest rate arbitrage have dramatic effects over short horizons. But this short term horizon is precisely the one over which the target zone can bring autonomy. In the end, the economics of Tobin taxes and those of target zones interfere with each other causing the relationship to be blurred in Figure 4 .a. The stability-autonomy trade-off is concealed behind a veil of arbitrage costs.
Section V. Beyond Covered Interest Parity
The previous discussion has shown that the success of a credible target zone cannot be gauged by looking at the relation between interest rate differentials and exchange rates since the former are only imperfectly related to expected exchange rate changes. On the other hand, from a policy point of view it is the ability to keep a low interest rate when foreign interest rises, and purchase that through a depreciated exchange rate, which makes a target zone system especially attractive. In other words, we need to drive our story home, and explore the dynamic causality between interest differentials and expected exchange rate changes. Figure 7 has shown that deviations from CIP were on average small and non-persistent. This implies that there was a mechanism that drove the interest rate differential towards the expected rate of depreciation or vice versa. Theory is a guide to determine the direction of causation: the basic principle on which rests the conduct of monetary policy in a target zone, is to use exchange depreciation as a substitute for interest rate changes. In other words, when German interest rates soared, AustroHungarian authorities should have been able not to follow suit. Instead, they could let the spot exchange rate fall and/or the forward rate rise in order to increase the forward premium. (5) where DEF is the expected rate of exchange-rate change, and ?i (i=1,2) are random shocks.
a) A new test for Target Zones
We argue that the data supports the views of contemporaries that the Habsburg TZ was successful and purchased short term policy autonomy if we find that ? ? Table 4 .a and b. The lag structure, VAR(4), was selected using optimizing procedures (conclusions are unaffected to the number of lags selected). In line with the discussion in the paper, we report separate results for the period of floating exchange rates and for the currency band era. Results are revealing. For the period of the float prior to 1896, for both equations, none of the coefficients of the lagged values of the other variable (bold-faced) is significant (Table 4a, columns 1 and 2, and Table 4 .b, columns 1 and 2). The Granger causality values reflect this by being small and insignificant.
23 By contrast, after 1896, we observe the emergence of an obvious one -way causality. It goes from the interest rate differential to the expected rate of depreciation, regardless of the interest differential we focus on. 24 This shows that once the band was adopted, a widening in the Vienna-Berlin interest rate spread, instead of leading to an automatic correction (with say, Austro-Hungarian rates tracking German rates) generated in the next few weeks a widening of the forward premium. Moreover, the estimated dynamic structure for bank-rates differentials (column 2 and 4 Tables 4a and 4b), is virtually identical before and after 1896, (except that during the float, bank rates tended to be marginally higher in Vienna than in Berlin, whereas during the TZ period it was the other way around). In other words, despite the transition to a fixed exchange rate regime Austro-Hungarian monetary authorities had been able to change their discount rate as infrequently in response to foreign shocks as they did prior to 1896, and even, on average, to lower it a bit. The stabilization of the currency within a band had thus succeeded in providing at least as much leeway as flexible exchange rates had done in the past. Despite having stabilized their currency within a narrow band, authorities could use the exchange rate as a substitute to interest rate hikes, following the lines of a literature that was not yet written. 
b) A case study: the international financial crisis of 1907.
Before we turn to the conclusions, it might be useful to spend some time on one specific episode which attracted much attention and was conventionally described as the masterpiece of Habsburg monetary authorities (Federn [1909] , ). The occasion was the international financial crisis of 1907, which originated in the US and reverberated quickly in major financial centers such as London and Berlin. The ability of the Habsburg monetary authorities to maintain a lower discount rate than the one prevailing in Berlin throughout the crisis, in spite of considerable pressure on the crown was widely described at the time as a high spot of monetary management. Figure 8 , derived from daily data, shows why contemporaries were enthusiastic. As can be seen before the Fall of 1907 when the crisis erupted, the florin tended to be relatively appreciated with respect to the mark (close to its lower boundary). During that period, the spot rate was systematically below the forward rate suggesting that market participants found currency depreciation more likely. As the crisis developed, the exchange rate depreciated, at the same time when the interest differential with
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Germany was growing larger. This is because as the spot rate depreciated, the forward rate rallied, ending its course below the spot rate. As a result there was no capital flight, and thus no special pressure to raise the official interest rates in Vienna, because few people cared to run the risk of a capital loss through currency recovery.
Clearly, in periods of crises as well as during "normal" times (as captured by our efficiency regressions), market participants expected exchange rates to return towards parity. Increased efficiency for a credible system did imply that agents systematically expected the exchange rate to appreciate when it was low and to depreciate when it was high. And this was something on which AustroHungarian monetary authorities could depend. Figure 8 
Conclusion
This Austro-Hungarian success story, in stark contrast to the utter failure of modern experiments with target zones, does hold a lesson for today: while letting the Austro-Hungarian currency fluctuate within an extremely narrow margin of less than 1%, Habsburg monetary authorities were, indeed, able to achieve their objective of minimizing the frequency of interest-rate changes, and especially to avoid reacting to foreign crises. In effect, they changed their discount rate 3 times less frequently than their German counterpart, in spite of the tight financial links that connected Berlin and Vienna.
At a general level, the device rested, as has been emphasized in the theoretical literature, on exchanging interest rate stability for exchange rate flexibility, and on a firm commitment to long-run exchange rate stability so as to achie ve credibility. Yet, as the paper argues, there were two more important features that played a decisive role in the outcome.
The first was foreign exchange market efficiency. We observed a dramatic increase in efficiency after the currency was stabilized within its band: after the turn of the century, the forward premium became an unbiased predictor of future exchange rate changes. And this implied that the market expected the florin to appreciate when it was weak and to depreciate when it was strong. That efficiency developed along with the implementation of the currency band is an important finding. It implies that the "rules" that define a given exchange rate regime do not only influence the behavior of policy makers, but also the very quality of expectations. This result can be interpreted in relation to the inability of forward rates to predict future exchange rate changes over short horizons when a currency is floating. In the highly uncertain environment of foreign exchange markets, the credible commitment of monetary policies to 17 keep the exchange rate within a narrow band, comes as a very relevant piece of information that improves the quality of forecasts. In turn, policy makers get a reward for this provides them with a measure of short term policy autonomy. The finding that the Austro-Hungarian currency band was defended with just a few more discount rate changes than needed during the period of float suggests that there was something like a free lunch. Our analysis explains why: by fostering market efficiency, a currency band may help policy makers to make full use of the market mechanism, a channel which we do not think the modern literature has ever recognized. 25 Second, our study of covered interest parity has demonstrated that one conventional way through which recent authors have tested, following Svensson, the target zone model (i.e. by running regressions of interest rate differentials on exchange rate deviation from parity and checking whether the estimated coefficient is negative) is inappropriate. Covered interest arbitrage involve costs, which albeit small, prove considerable over the short run horizon which is precisely the horizon for which a TZ can provide some autonomy: the logic of Tobin tax conceals the relation between exchange rate deviation from parity and interest differentials behind a cloud of arbitrage costs: but it does not destroy it -much to the contrary. Granger causality tests enables us to go beyond deceptive features and uncover a phenomenon which is at the heart of the economics of successful TZ: namely, that there should be a dynamic, one way, causation going from interest rate differentials to the forward premium. Thus when money rates rose in Berlin, Vienna could avoid to respond in kind. Instead, Austro-Hungarian autho rities could let the exchange rate depreciate, trusting that before long markets would bid the florin up.
Keynes is often alleged to have said, that "every policy maker is the victim of a dead economist". At the end of this paper, one is left wondering why it takes so long to economists to digest the heritage of deceased policymakers. 
Data appendix.
Forward markets in foreign exchange facilitate transactions in goods and securities across the borders if at least one of the countries has fluctuating exchange rates. Thus, there were less reasons for futures to develop among the German reichsmark, the French franc, or the British pound, because all were on essentially fixed exchange rates even prior to the advent of the gold standard. However, among the mark, on the one hand, and such currencies as Austria-Hungary's florin and the Russian ruble this need did arise, insofar as Germany was both Russia's and Austria-Hungary's most important trading, and perhaps financial, partner, with both the florin and the ruble effectively on a flexible exchange rate until the 1890s. Fluctuations of the florin-reichsmark exchange rate before 1896 were very large.
In Vienna, as in other European markets, there was thus also a forward market in general securities. These forward transactions were to be settled -liquidated -mostly at the end of the month, named after the French word «liquidation». As emphasized by Haupt [1894] , international arbitrage in securities was a routine operation in late-nineteenth-century Europe. It rested on a borrowing on a given security in a market (say Berlin) where the corresponding rate (known as «report») was low and lending on a market (say Vienna) where the rate was high. Doing so, however, involved an element of risk due to the possibility of exchange fluctuations. Obviously, the only way to be covered against these fluctuations was to have a forward exchange market that would clear at the same dates as the markets for forward securities, and thus enable one to perform a «true» (i.e. risk free) arbitrage. It is thus not surprising to find that, along with the «ultimo» quotes for general securities there were also in Vienna «ultimo» quotes for German marks and Russian rubles, in addition to the «spot» (or «per cassa») rates. Interestingly, this provides a rationale for the development of the forward markets that points to the combined influence of floating exchange rates and international financial arbitrage.
In order to cover merchants' risks, as well as risks associated with arbitrage on securities denominated in foreign currencies, large markets for future delivery of foreign currencies evolved in Central Europe in the last third of the nineteenth century with traders specializing in the business (Lotz, 1889 (Lotz, , 1279 . Gulden-mark futures came into being, probably well before 1876 when published data first appeared (Einzig, 1937, 31-38) . Indeed, it is noteworthy that the official quotation of forward mark rates in Vienna began in 1876, precisely in a year of especially large exchange rate volatility (Flandreau and Komlos, 2001) . There were also forward markets in Vienna in other major currencies, but these were small and were not quoted in the official publications. (An exception was the 20 French Franc gold piece and the rubel which were quoted forward.) (Federn, 1910a, 164) . The forward market in rubels first came into being in Breslau and Königsberg and subsequently in Berlin (Schulze-Gävernitz, 1899, 503-4) , and futures in rubels were also traded in Vienna (Knapp, 1905, 252) . Most importantly, and apparently unlike its Russian counterpart, the Austrian forward exchange market survived the stabilization of the florin in the 1890s.
Our exchange rate data were collected from the Wiener Börsekammer Coursblätter, in the archive of the Wiener Börse A.G., Strauchgasse 1-3, A-1014 Vienna, Austria. Schneider et a. [1990] and Schneider et al. [1993] have spot, but not forward rates. Forward rates were also published in the Wiener Zeitung as well as in the Neue Freie Presse. A comparison among the three sources indicated only marginal deviations. The Coursblatter is more systematic in that it gives a series of quotes, day high, day low, mid day, closing. Closing quotes were the most comprehensive and were thus the ones we collected. Spot (per cassa) exchange rates with Germany are reported from January 1870 until the Summer of 1914 in all three sources. Until February 1873, though, they are reported in florins per 100 marks bancos, the Hamburg unit (Hamburg was Germany's prominent foreign exchange market until Germany's monetary unification which shifted business to Berlin). Rates switched to German marks in February 1873 with the advent of the new German currency. In order to obtain a homogeneous series in florins per marks, we divided the quotes in Mark Banco by 1,5. The sources report both « Geld » and « Waare » rates. « Geld » prices were the bid price, the price at which people were willing to buy foreign exchange and offering local money. « Waare » was the price at which people were offering to sell the "goods" (in this case Marks). Forward rates are available from November 1876 until June 1889 under the heading "Liquidations Course", but no distinction was made between bid and ask rates. From July 1889 onwards, the forward rates were quoted as «Ultimo», and the distinction between bid and ask rates appeared. Moreover, from January 1900 quotes are given in Crowns per 100 mark and the quotes were divided by 2 in order a homogeneous series.
Given that forward rates are quoted for the end of the month (liquidation date) the best date to collect the figures is the first day of the month after the previous liquidation. When this was a bank holiday, we collected the next available quote. Three observations need special mention:
? Spot quotes were not reported for 2.10.1871, and we used the rate for 3.10.1871. ? 2.2.1911, the value for the spot rate: 117.800 is clearly a typographical error (because bid price exceeded the ask price) and we used instead 117.300, as the obvious value. We would have gotten the same results if we had used midday values. ? For 01.04.1913 we use midday values for both spot and forward rates, because end-of-day value is unavailable for forward rate. We then constructed two series. A series of average bid/ask rates ({Geld(t)+Waare(t)]/2, 1876 :11 29 Figure 5 . Annualized "expected" exchange rate change (%) in terms of exchange rate deviation from parity (%) (1901:8 -1914:8) Source: see text 
